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SCIENCE, SOCIETY, AND THE
EXPERT TOWN MEETING: SOME
COMMENTS ON ASILOMAR
ROGER B. DwoRKIN*
Conventional legal institutions cannot cope adequately with the social
issues raised by rapid scientific advance.1 Our institutions necessarily
learn of new scientific developments after they occur and have been
publicized. The institutions are impotent to control the international
aspects of scientific advance despite the inevitable impact of foreign
developments on our well-being; they are inadequate to control those
bent on misusing techniques for evil purposes, as our experience with
terrorism indicates. We do not have an adequate mechanism to check
the government itself if it, or some parts of it, should become commit-
ted to a generally undesired course; whatever the ability of our system
to govern the governors in most matters, secrecy, incomprehensibility,
and lack of built-in checks prevent that control in the scientific realm.
Finally, lack of prescience about the full range of implications of new
developments in science confounds every effort at intelligent control.
New institutions are needed for the social control of science. One
proposed institution, the so-called Science Court,' has received some
attention and may even be used experimentally.3 Another new institu-
tion has already been tried without being classified as an institution.
The Asilomar Conference, an expert town meeting on recombinant
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington. A.B. 1963,
Princeton University; J.D. 1966, Stanford University. The author wishes to thank Dr. Paul Berg
and Mr. Daniel Singer for their kindness in making his attendance and participation at the
Asilomar Conference possible. All unacknowledged statements of fact about the proceedings at
Asilomar are the author's eyewitness accounts.
1. For development of the points made in this paragraph, see Dworkin, Legal Institutions
and Recombinant DNA Research (ms.). See also Dworkin, Biocatastrophe and the Law: Legal
Aspects of Recombinant DNA Research, in THE RECOMBINANT DNA DEBATE (D. Jackson & S.
Stitch eds. forthcoming).
2. See generally Martin, The Proposed "Science Court,"75 MICH. L. REv. 1058 (1977).
3. Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and
Technology, The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report, 193 SCIENCE 653 (1976).
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DNA, represented a blend of the oldest institution of American democ-
racy with modem elements of internationalism and expertise. We
ought not to allow interest in the substantive recombinant DNA con-
troversy to prevent us from evaluating the expert town meeting as a
device for mediating the social issues posed by scientific advance.
I. THE ASILOMAR CONFERENCE
The Asilomar Conference was held in February 1975, approximately 2
years after the recombinant DNA controversy surfaced. It was orga-
nized by a committee of six distinguished scientists, four from the
United States and two from abroad, with assistance from the National
Academy of Sciences-National Research Council (NAS-NRC) and
with funding from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the Na-
tional Science Foundation. In addition to the organizers and the staff
representatives of the NAS-NRC, the meeting was attended by eighty-
two American and fifty-two foreign scientists, and four people the press
insisted on describing as "lawyers." Technically, the "lawyers" were
lawyers, but hardly in the sense the term suggests. Two were full-time
law professors and a third was a law professor who also maintained a
role in a law firm. Only one was a nonacademic practitioner, but he
too was hardly typical, being both vice president of the Institute of So-
ciety, Ethics and the Life Sciences (a group devoted to the study of
"bioethics") and the husband of one of the organizing scientists and
original leaders in raising the issue of recombinant DNA. In addition,
sixteen representatives of the press, from such diverse employers as the
New York Times, Science, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation,
Frankfurter 41lgemeine, and Rolling Stone attended. Conspicuously
absent were representatives of the most vocal group of scientists op-
posed to recombinant DNA research. Rather than attend, they sent an
"Open Letter"4 to participants at the conference criticizing the "molec-
ular biology community" for usurping decisionmaking authority and
calling for direct involvement by the "general public."
The setting for the Asilomar Conference was an idyllic beach-front
location near Pacific Grove, California, on the Monterey Peninsula.
Participants lived together in motel-like accommodations with assigned
roommates. They ate together at appointed meal hours in a general
dining hall. Both the structure of the conference and the location and
4. Open Letter from Genetic Engineering Group of Science for the People to the Asilomar
Conference on Hazards of Recombinant DNA (1975).
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nature of Asilomar discouraged the participants from leaving the
grounds.
The conference ran from 8:30 a.m., Monday, February 24, 1975, to
noon, Thursday, February 27. Scheduled sessions occurred in the
morning, afternoon, and night. As everyone knew, the conference had
been called to debate whether to lift the moratorium on certain kinds of
recombinant DNA research and to propose guidelines for the accepta-
ble performance of any permitted recombinant DNA experiments.
That is, the purpose of the meeting was to make scientific policy and
propose public policy. Despite that purpose, the only times specifically
allotted to policy discussion were a short period on Monday afternoon
when Professor Harold Green of the George Washington University
National Law Center presented "A Public Policy Perspective" and
Wednesday ight when the three remaining "lawyers" spoke and all
four of the "lawyers" sat as a panel to answer questions. The rest of
the meeting, except for the last morning session, was virtually indistin-
guishable from an ordinary scientific meeting held for the purpose of
exchanging information. The final morning was devoted to discussion
and adoption of the conference statement.
The conference began with David Baltimore' from the Massachu-
setts Institute of Technology (MIT) stating the history and purpose of
the meeting. The opening address was followed by 3 days of exclu-
sively scientific discussion. Distinguished investigators presented data,
showed slides, and asked each other technical questions. Occasional
inquiries from the floor about public policy implications were ignored
or ruled out of order as questioners were reminded that the group
would consider those matters on Wednesday night. The exception to
this lack of interest in policy was the oft repeated statement that it was
crucial to avoid outside control. While the official sessions stuck to
science, a select group apparently worked well into the nights attempt-
ing to draft the conference statement. To the author's knowledge, this
group neither sought nor received any information or assistance from
the "lawyers."
After 3 days of science, public policy was finally considered on
Wednesday night. Each of the three speakers was allotted 20 minutes.
Daniel Singer, a Washington, D.C., lawyer with family and institu-
tional connections mentioned above, spoke generally on the role of eth-
ics in policymaking and the social responsibility of the scientist.
5. David Baltimore was awarded the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1975 for discoveries con-
cerning interaction between tumor viruses and genetic material of the cell.
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Professor Alexander Capron of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School discussed regulatory options and institutional avenues available
for the control of recombinant DNA research. This author discussed
tort, workmen's compensation, and Occupational, Safety and Health
Act (OSHA)6 aspects of recombinant DNA research.
Only Professor Capron criticized the participants for failing to
come to grips with the policy issues they were supposed to address.
Although his speech roused the participants, they responded most
strongly when this author told them that they might be held liable if
anyone were injured as a result of their work. What a legal audience
would have regarded as commonplace, elementary, and obvious, struck
the distinguished scientists as novel, shocking, and frightening. Call-
ing the researchers' attention to their potential liability induced a fear
in them akin to a layperson's fear of virulent bugs crawling out of a
laboratory. Moreover, pointing out the potential liability was widely
interpreted as glorying in it and as manifesting opposition to recombi-
nant DNA research, despite attempts to be of assistance by suggesting
that the scientists would be well-advised to err on the side of overregu-
lating themselves if they really wished to avoid outside control.
The drafters of the conference statement worked most of Wednes-
day night to finish their product. On Thursday, several of them told
the author that the legal discussion the night before had had a major
impact on their thinking and on the statement.7 The statement lifted
the moratorium and described the safeguards considered appropriate
for recombinant DNA experiments. The procedure by which the
statement was adopted was remarkable. The 2500-word document
was distributed to the participants Thursday morning at 8:30 a.m., and
discussion began at 9:00. The meeting had to end by noon. Dr. Paul
Berg, the principal conference organizer, presented the statement. The
group then discussed and voted on each provision separately. Several
amendments were offered from the floor. These were stated so rapidly
that it was difficult, if not impossible, to write them down. Requests
for repetition, fuller discussion, amendments to amendments, and so
forth were met with constant reminders of the need to finish by noon
and by the iterated and reiterated assertion that the language did not
have to be perfect because the statement was not a "legal" document.
Nobel laureate Joshua Lederberg complained that the group was being
6. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970)(codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 18, 21, 42,
49 U.S.C.).
7. See Provisional Statement of the Conference Proceedings, Feb. 27, 1975.
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"railroaded"8 but the other participants did not complain. Shortly
before noon the group overwhelmingly adopted the conference state-
ment. The statement was redrafted and submitted to the NIH on May
20, 1975.9 It served as the basis for the now famous "NIH Guidelines"
for recombinant DNA research,'" which remain the principal legal
control mechanism in this field.
II. THE EXPERT TOWN MEETING: ASILOMAR AND
BEYOND
What is one to make of the Asilomar Conference? Ought it to serve as
a model for future efforts at the social control of science?
To a person intellectually and emotionally immersed in the Amer-
ican legal system, Asilomar was nearly beyond belief. Given, how-
ever, that the American legal system is inadequate to cope with rapid
scientific advance," the observation that the Conference procedures
bore little resemblance to traditional methods of decisionmaking is not
necessarily a criticism. Moreover, the Conference in some ways repre-
sented almost classic and long abandoned American notions of demo-
cratic rule.
Asilomar was organized by self-appointed leaders (albeit with the
sanction of the federal bureaucracy) whose claims to legitimacy in their
leadership roles rested on scientific distinction and moral foresight and
commitment. It was financed by the government, which intended to
use the Conference's conclusions as the basis for governmental action.
Asilomar was attended by experts in the scientific disciplines being
studied, but it was boycotted by those who represented the strongest
negative viewpoints. The scientific experts in attendance neither pos-
sessed nor claimed to possess any expertise in matters of law, ethics, or
any of the other policy arts. The policy experts were outnumbered
approximately thirty-five to one, represented very limited spheres of
policy making concern, and were largely "ghettoized" and put off until
a point in the agenda at which they could have little impact.
8. Wash. Post, Mar. 9, 1975, § B, at 4, col 4.
9. Berg, Baltimore, Brenner, Roblin, & Singer, Summary Statement ofthe Asilomar Confer-
ence on Recombinant DN4 Molecules, 72 PRoc. NAT'L AcAD. Sci. USA 1981 (1975), reprinted in
188 SCIENCE 991 (1975).
10. National Institutes of Health, Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA
Molecules, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,911 (1976). See also National Institutes of Health, Recombinant
DNA Research, Proposed Revised Guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg. 33,042 (1978).
11. See note I supra.
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The policy discussion of the scientific experts was, as one might
expect, largely nonexistent. Being human, the scientists discussed the
subject they know and like-science. When forced to decide matters
of policy, they reached a solution that may well make scienfc sense,
but was tempered only by the two policy constraints they under-
stood-the twin terrors of personal liability and external control. The
scientists achieved consensus (almost unanimity) without the benefit of
orderly procedure, careful attention to specifics of language, or signifi-
cant debate about their position. The conclusions were then redrafted
before being submitted for governmental action.
This is incredible! Is it bad?
At the outset, one must state that the Asilomar Conference was not
"bad" in any moral sense of the term. The organizers can perhaps be
characterized as self-serving competitors in the race for scientific
glory12 and as self-appointed arbiters of the risks the rest of us must
bear, but the fact remains that they imposed a voluntary, 2-year mora-
torium on their own work, alerted the public to recombinant DNA
problems, organized a meeting to deal with those problems, invited
their opponents to attend, invited the press to attend, and risked incur-
ring the collective wrath of their professional colleagues by opening the
sacred halls of science to public scrutiny. It is hard to believe that any
of them is better off now than he would have been had he left well
enough alone. Furthermore, criticism of the Asilomar organizers for
not adequately involving the "general public" may be meant as a moral
criticism; but properly understood, it is simply a criticism of six scien-
tists for lacking the same transcendent social wisdom that all humanity
has lacked throughout its history.
Even if Asilomar cannot fairly be deemed a moral failure, it may
still be a failure in practical, institutional terms. The Asilomar Confer-
ence was a meeting of experts trying as a group to make social policy
about matters within their sphere of knowledge. The Conference re-
sembled nothing so much as a New England town meeting of the 17th
or 18th century except that at Asilomar the "town" was, to use the label
provided by its opponents, the "molecular biology community."' 3
The molecular biology community, or at least that part of it that
attended Asilomar, was, like an 18th century New England town:
12. For the classic demonstration of the race and the glory, see J. WArsoN, THE DOUBLE
H.Lax (1968). For a current account of another race that led to glory, see Wade, GuIllemin and
Schally: The Three-Lap Race to Stockholm, 200 SCIENCE 279, 411, 510 (1978).
13. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
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"small and compact, the congregations watchful; every person was
tuned to the movements of his neighbor." Residential arrangements
. . . "made for close living" among others "visible and ever present,"
and the deployment of social space was precisely paralleled by the
use of time: there was "frequent daily intercourse of neighbors and
townfolk," . . . and "enforced frequent sabbatarian communion."
Together the utilization of time and the arrangement of space con-
tributed to what Conrad Arensburg called. .. "a dense collective
experience." 1
4
As with a New England town, this "dense collective experience" led,
not surprisingly, to an overwhelming need and desire for peace and
agreement among the townsfolk. "[T]he private consciences of the
community had to be brought into concert." 5 As a practical matter,
the town achieved both consensus and peace by remitting primary au-
thority to the town's selectmen and simply ratifying the selectmen's de-
cisions.1 6 The Asilomar participants followed the same course.
The Asilomar participants comprised a subgroup of individuals
who were even closer in their viewpoints than the already close scien-
tific community at large. The subgroup lived for 3 days in very close
contact with each other, in each other's constant view, essentially in
"enforced . . communion."17 They had to reach agreement. The
time constraints of the conference, the expectations of the funding
agencies, the public attention provided by the press, and the need to get
on with their own work all demanded it. The Conference participants'
response to these factors was to adopt the same techniques as did the
17th or 18th century New England town: the "selectmen" (organizers)
proposed and the "townspeople" (conference participants) adopted.
The achieved solidarity, mutuality of respect, and appearance of de-
mocracy made the work product of the group "morally binding" on all
who participated.
14. M. ZUCKERMAN, PEACEABLE KINGDOMS 48 (1970) (quoting K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD
PURITANS: A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 170 (1966)).
15. Id. at 50.
Distinctive elements and common ones came together in the institution and idea of the
covenant.... Unanimous consent was its form and the pledge of peace an essential
part of its substance; by it a divine sanction was secured for the "mutual love and re-
spect" thus sworn by a community "bound up together in a bundle of life." And be-
cause such accords were voluntarily subscribed and then morally binding upon their
subscribers, they... conferred a special solidarity upon the social and institutional ar-
rangements of the communities.
Id. at 54-55.
16. Lockridge & Kreider, The Evolution of Massachusetts Town Government 1640 to 1740, in
COLONIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS IN POLITICS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 203, 206-08 (S. Katz ed.
1971).
17. M. ZUCKERMAN, supra note 14.
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Of course, it was not morally binding on those who refused to at-
tend. One may speculate about whether the refusal to attend might
not have been an effort to avoid being morally bound. After all, the
dissidents could only have achieved one of four things had they at-
tended: They could have prevented the conference from adopting any
statement; they could have caused the adoption of a statement oppos-
ing recombinant DNA research; they coul4 have joined in a modified,
compromise statement; or they could have dissented from the statement
adopted. The latter two options would have defeated the objectives of
the dissenters by giving moral legitimacy to an adopted statement, sac-
rificing their goal of public participation, and permitting recombinant
DNA research to proceed. Unless the dissidents thought they had the
strength to prevent any statement or to adopt an anti-recombinant
DNA position, they chose the only practical course open to
them-boycotting the Conference.
In fact, however, the absence of binding moral effect on the dis-
senters is only important to evaluating the Asilomar Conference as an
institution. The dissenters oppose all recombinant DNA research,
and, therefore, one need not fear that they will do research in ways
more dangerous than the Asilomar statement proposed. What is
significant is that their absence prevented the statement from silencing
their criticisms.
If Asilomar had some of the features of a New England town
meeting, it also had many differences. This Article shall mention only
the important ones. First, the Asilomar Conference was an expert
town meeting. Except for the four "lawyers," all the participants were
experts in the subject under consideration. Second, although Asilomar
had only four participants from outside the molecular biology commu-
nity, it had a large representation from outside the United States.
Thus, its 'jurisdiction" was much larger than that of the traditional
town meeting. At the same time, however, the power of the conference
was less than that of the town meeting. Even if the New England
town's decisions gained most of their strength from unanimity and
moral suasion, they also had the force of law. The Asilomar statement
had no legal stature outside the United States and was only advisory to
a federal agency here.
III. ASILOMAR AS A MODEL
The Asilomar-style expert town meeting is an exciting, but ulti-
mately unsatisfactory attempt at devising a new institution to cope with
1478
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rapid scientific change. The Asilomar Conference demonstrates the
possibility of self-restraint and the consideration by decisionmakers of
ends other than their own. In this age of cynicism, that demonstration
alone makes the Asilomar Conference worthwhile. To criticize the
Conference because its participants considered their own ends as well
as those of others is unfair, because their ends are no less deserving of
consideration than anyone else's. Similarly, it is inappropriate to criti-
cize the Conference as an institution simply because it recommended
lifting the moratorium on recombinant DNA research. Such a criti-
cism can be leveled at any institution that reaches a result with which
one disagrees. The criticism has no force unless the decision to lift the
moratorium was incorrect on the merits. It is too early to tell whether
it was incorrect, and this author is hardly qualified to make the judg-
ment. Since 1975, however, some of the promised benefits 8 and none
of the threatened harms' 9 of recombinant DNA research have begun to
emerge.
Asilomar was also a healthy step in the direction of recognizing
and confronting our institutional inadequacy to deal with the interna-
tional aspects of science. By including foreign representatives in the
Conference, the organizers gained those individuals' insights, strength-
ened the international moral force of the restrictions they proposed,
and probably reduced foreign scientists' fears of American scientists
rushing unrestrained toward new breakthroughs. This, in turn, should
increase the likelihood that other nations will also proceed slowly, thus
providing some worldwide increase in safety.
Despite these advantages, the expert town meeting, if Asilomar is a
good model, is not a very promising addition to our institutional ability
to control science. The expert town meeting cannot address some of
the things that an effective institution must confront, and performs in-
adequately those things that it does attempt.
The basic failing of an Asilomar-type expert town meeting is its
lack of power. Moral suasion is wonderful, but it is not enough. A
real town meeting had the power to make law; the Asilomar conferees,
however, could not bind anyone. A legal institution with only moral
power is not much of a legal institution.
18. See Ullrich, Shine, Chirgwin, Pictet, Tischer, Rutter, & Goodman, Rat Insulin Genes:
Construction of Plasmids Containing the Coding Sequences, 196 ScIENCE 1313 (1977).
19. Decision of the Director, National Institutes of Health, to Issue Revised Guidelines for
Recombinant DNA Research, 42 Fed. Reg. 33,043, 33,044 (1978).
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Of course, society could create expert town meetings by statute or
constitutional amendment in order to overcome the lack of authority.
I suggest that this would be a serious mistake. The real town meeting
gained its legal, as well as its moral, authority from the existence of
consensus.20 No such consensus exists with respect to the social issues
posed by modem science. Asilomar presented the appearance of con-
sensus only because the dissenters stayed away. The appearance of
consensus, however, is no basis for the rule of law, and forced partici-
pation in a "democratic" process hardly bodes well. In any event,
even if all the experts participate and agree, the case for empowering
the expert body to make ultimate decisions cannot be made.
Social decisions about scientific matters are precisely that-social
decisions. Scientific information is relevant to such decisions, but not
controlling.21 Questions of economics, ethics, administrative conven-
ience, and a wide range of other concerns, including (even if the scien-
tists shudder) those of language and linguistic precision, are part of any
sound decisionmaking process. Aside from questions of legitimacy,
scientists as a group have neither training nor inclination for the con-
sideration and integration of those concerns; Asilomar demonstrated
that. The participants neither wanted, nor were able, to discuss non-
scientific matters. They reacted to law with fear, to language with con-
tempt, and to ethics with tolerant disregard. Other relevant policy
perspectives were never even raised. Remitting decisionmaking in
matters of science policy to the scientific experts comes very close to
guaranteeing unidimensional decisionmaking. Given the many facets
of all social problems, unidimensional decisionmaking will almost al-
ways be inadequate.
Decisional inadequacies are compounded by the appearance of
impropriety and the resultant weakening in the moral authority of the
expert town meeting and its product. When scientists decide what con-
trols will apply to scientists, they leave themselves open to the charge of
being foxes sent to guard the chicken coop. A conflict of interest may
not result in evil, but the appearance of evil cannot be avoided. Thus,
one need not assume that scientists will regulate in their own interest to
disqualify them from the role of governing science. They are disquali-
fied by the ease of making the charge and the impossibility of defend-
20. See M. ZucKERMAN, supra note 14, passim.
21. An example of what happens when legal institutions remit too much authority to experts
and of one court's efforts to regain control is the history of the insanity defense in the District of
Columbia Circuit. Compare Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) with United
States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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ing against it. In issues as controversial as those posed by scientific
advance, the decisionmaker cannot bear the weight of an unanswerable
criticism, whether well founded or not.
More serious than the expert town meeting's inadequacies in the
area where it functions is its inability to address the most serious inade-
quacies in our present institutional response to science. The recombi-
nant DNA episode is seemingly the high-water mark of scientific
responsibility and early awareness of the social implications of a scien-
tific development. One can hardly imagine a policy forum of any
kind, including an expert town meeting, occurring earlier in the devel-
opment of a technology than did Asilomar. This is especially true
when one remembers that the moratorium halted important aspects of
recombinant DNA technology for 2 years while the conference was be-
ing organized.
Despite this early involvement, the Conference came too late. By
the time of the Asilomar Conference, recombinant DNA technology
existed, had been publicized, and had generated excitement. Indeed,
existence and awareness were prerequisites to the Asilomar Confer-
ence. But the existence and awareness rendered the Conference impo-
tent. The most basic questions-should this research be allowed?
ever? by anyone? anywhere?-had already been answered. The
thought of not doing recombinant DNA research never surfaced at
Asilomar. Given the rush of events, it would have been a meaningless
issue to consider. So it always is in science policy. The expert town
meeting may be useful for backing and filling and for moderating fore-
gone conclusions, but our greatest need is for an institution that can
anticipate problems before options are foreclosed. The expert town
meeting cannot fill that need.
The second greatest need in establishing control of science is to
develop an institution that can govern the government. The history of
human experimentation" and of other developments' suggests that
the government is the most likely abuser of science. A meeting of ex-
perts, whatever its legislative mandate, and even if it were not funded
by the government, is not likely to impose meaningful controls on the
state. What is needed is a major rethinking of both power distribu-
22. See, eg., U.S. Injected Plutonium in 18 Persons in Experiment to Determine its Effects,
Louisville Courier J., Feb. 23, 1976, § A, at 8, col. 1.
23. For a report of a conference to evaluate the propriety of a potentially useful medical
technique that poses serious legal and ethical problems held after the government itself had begun
using the technique, see NATIONAL INSTITUTEs OF HEALTH, SINGLE DONOR PLATELET TRANSFU-
SIONS: SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS (1975).
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tions and the role of government in the science process. That too is a
big order, which the expert town meeting cannot fill.
Of course, the expert town meeting cannot cope with terrorism and
can deal only on a moral level with the establishment of international
controls. Those deficiencies, however, pale to insignificance beside the
inability to anticipate problems and to control the government.
Clear articulation of our institutional deficiencies in coping with
science along with bold, creative thinking about new institutions should
be high on the national and international agendas. The Science Court
and the expert town meeting at Asilomar are two healthy examples of
institutional innovations. If, however, these developments are not par-
ticularly useful, then further innovations are required. Science will not
wait for the institutions; the institutions must be created soon to deal
with emerging science.
